The Right to Counsel in Prosecutorial Interrogations by Serban, Daniel E.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 57 | Issue 3 Article 7
Spring 1982
The Right to Counsel in Prosecutorial
Interrogations
Daniel E. Serban
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Serban, Daniel E. (1982) "The Right to Counsel in Prosecutorial Interrogations," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 57 : Iss. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol57/iss3/7
The Right to Counsel in Prosecutorial Interrogations
In an attempt to bring crime under control, a growing number of states
are extending to prosecutors the power to subpoena witnesses, including
suspects, and to require them, under penalty of contempt, to answer
questions.1 This subpoena power can be used to compel reluctant witnesses
to come forward with vital information, thereby hastening the
investigative process. Suspects can also be required to account for their
actions relating to a particular crime. The information gained can then
be used by the prosecutor to decide whether to file charges against a
suspect.
A conflict has developed among state courts regarding the right of a
subpoenaed witness to have counsel present at prosecutorial
interrogations.2 This note argues that the fifth amendment, through the
holding in Miranda v. Arizona,' and the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment require that a witness subpoenaed to answer a pro-
secutor's questions has the right to have counsel present during the
interrogation.4 The analysis includes examination of several types of
interrogations which possess varying degrees of similarity to interroga-
tions conducted by prosecutors. First, the note compares the potential
for abusive treatment of a witness at a grand jury investigation with the
similar danger posed by prosecutorial interrogations. The note concludes,
however, that sufficient similarities between the two proceedings do not
exist to deny the right to counsel at a prosecutorial investigation, despite
the absence of any such right in grand jury investigations. Second, the
note examines the differences between administrative interrogations and
interrogations by a prosecutor to show why they should not be adjudicated
by the same rule. Third, the note explores police interrogations and deter-
mines that sufficient similarities exist between prosecutorial and police
' See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, S 2504(4) (1979); N.Y. CRM. PR0C. LAW § 610.20 (McKin-
ney 1971). Most recently, the Indiana Supreme Court extended subpoena power to pros-
ecutors in In re Order For Indiana Bell Tel. To Disclose Records, - Ind. __, 409 N.E.2d
1089, 1091-92 (1980).
Prosecutorial subpoena power has been advocated by several organizations. See
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE 244-46
(1973); NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 121-22
(1977).
2 Compare Gill v. State ex rel. Mobley, 242 Ark. 797, 416 S.W.2d 269 (1967) with Gordon
v. Gerstein, 189 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1966). This note focuses on the rights of potential defen-
dants at prosecutorial interrogations although a few comments are directed toward the
questioning of witnesses who are not potential defendants.
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The proposal argued by this note indirectly raises the issue whether the right to
have counsel present at prosecutorial interrogations necessarily implies the right to have
counsel furnished for this purpose to indigents. Due to the breadth of the constitutional
and policy considerations involved in this issue, however, it is beyond the scope of this note.
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interrogations to require the extension of the Miranda right to counsel
to prosecutorial interrogations. Fourth, the note examines the possible
application of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to pros-
ecutorial interrogations and concludes that it also requires that individuals
have the right to counsel when questioned by prosecutors.
POSSIBLE MODELS FOR PROSECUTORIAL INTERROGATIONS
Protection for Witnesses Questioned Before a Grand Jury
Prosecutorial interrogations have been analogized to grand jury
investigations.5 Both share an investigatory purpose6 and under both
proceedings subpoenas may be issued to compel testimony.' Should this
analogy be extended to include the right to counsel, a person questioned
by a prosecutor would be allowed to have counsel standing by in an adja-
cent room for consultation, but would not be allowed to have counsel pre-
sent in the room where the questioning is taking place!
The persuasiveness of an analogy between interrogations by a pros-
ecutor and grand jury investigations has been questioned." Prosecutorial
interrogations lack the fundamental safeguard embodied in grand jury
proceedings,"° the presence of neutral grand jurors." Without this
safeguard, an individual questioned by a prosecutor has little protection
from coercion by the prosecutor. 2 This potential for abuse has been
I See Dinnen v. State, 168 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); State v. Iverson,
187 N.W.2d 1, 17 (N.D. 1971). But see Gordon v. Gerstein, 189 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1966)
(court upheld Dinnen but finds no analogy between a grand jury and a prosecutor's inquest
under Flordia law).
6 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65-66 (1906); State ex rel. Pollard v. Criminal Court,
263 Ind. 236, 329 N.E.2d 573 (1975).
7 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-801 (1977); see Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 713 (5th ed. 1980).,
1 See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976). The majority of states follow
a similar practice. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 7, at 783. For a discus-
sion of state practices, see id. at 782-83.
See Gordon v. Gerstein, 189 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1966).
,I For the historical development of the grand jury, see G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY
1-44 (1973); R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL (1963).
11 Justice Black has described the importance of the presence of the grand jury:
They bring into the grand jury room the experience, knowledge and view-
point of all sections of the community. They have no axes to grind and are
not charged personally with the administration of the law. No one of them
is a prosecuting attorney or law-enforcement officer ferreting out crime. It
would be very difficult for officers of the state seriously to abuse or deceive
a witness in the presence of the grand jury. Similarly the presence of the
jurors offers a substantial safeguard against the officers' misrepresentation,
unintentional or otherwise, of the witness' statements and conduct before the
grand jury. The witness can call on the grand jurors if need be for their
normally unbiased testimony as to what occurred before them.
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 347 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
12 "It takes little imagination to foresee the oppression that could result if prosecuting
[Vol. 57:499
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
recognized by courts, but not discussed in the context of the availability
of the right to counsel.1 3 With only the prosecutor's staff in attendance
at the interrogation, the witness is fair game for any unsavory tactics
the prosecutor may wish to employ. These tactics could range from "Mutt
and Jeff' psychological techniques 4 to severe physical beatings.'5 Because
the presence of jurors prevents many of these abuses, the secret question-
ing of a witness by a prosecutor renders the limited access to counsel
given to a witness before a grand jury insufficient to protect the rights
of a witness questioned by a prosecutor.
Grand jury witnesses are also protected by the fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.'8 A witness may un-
knowingly forfeit this privilege if he is not aware of his rights and makes
inculpatory statements.'7 Through coercion a witness may also be forced
to give up his rights.'8 Through their presence, grand jurors prevent a
coercive atmosphere conducive to the unknowing or involuntary forfeiture
of rights by a witness. 9 Similar protection is not available for an individual
questioned by a prosecutor." Without some equivalent safeguard, an
unknowledgeable witness may fall prey to the skill and cunning of a
prosecutor.21 The presence of counsel would prevent abuse by eliminating
a coercive atmosphere in the same way that grand jurors do and would
guarantee the availability of advice about constitutional rights at a pros-
cutorial interrogation.
attorneys are given the power [to question witnesses without the presence of counsel]."
Gill v. State ex rel. Mobley, 242 Ark. 797, 799, 416 S.W.2d 269, 271 (1967).
," See Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 255 (E.D. Ark.), affid per curiam, 393 U.S.
14 (1968); Duckett v. State, 600 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
" See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 452 (1966).
, See, e.g., Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1958).
The applicable clause of the fifth amendment states: "No person ... shall be compell-
ed in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. This
privilege against complusory self-incrimination was extended to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
" The danger that a witness will be unaware of his privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination could be avoided by a requirement that all witnesses be informed of this
right before questioning. This question was expressly left open in United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 582 n.7 (1976). States have disagreed whether a grand jury witness
who is a potential defendant must be given self-incrimination warnings. Compare State
ez rel. Lowe v. Nelson, 202 So. 2d 232, 234-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), affd, 210 So. 2d
197 (Fla. 1968) (the Miranda warning is not applicable to a witness appearing before a
grand jury) with Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 143, 277 A.2d 764, 777 (1971)
(to preserve the privilege against self incrimination a witness should be given a warning
at a grand jury hearing). The Indiana Supreme Court has required that all grand jury
witnesses be given self-incrimination warnings. State ex rel. Pollard v. Criminal Court, 263
Ind. 236, 259, 329 N.E.2d 573, 589 (1975).
" See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
" See note 11 supra.
1 The fifth amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, however, appears
to apply to prosecutorial interrogations. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra
note 7, at 723.
" See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 341-42 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Four reasons have been advanced for not allowing counsel to accom-
pany a witness into the grand jury room. First, "the grand jury is an
investigation rather than a prosecution."' Second, "the presence of counsel
would breach the secrecy of the proceeding."' Third, "counsel would
disrupt the ex parte nature of the proceeding and cause delays."' Fourth,
"the witness whose rights are abused has sufficient opportunity to
exonerate himself at trial.""'
The first two justifications for the exclusion of counsel do not logically
apply to prosecutorial interrogations. The first is not applicable because
an interrogation conducted and controlled wholly by the prosecutor, in
contrast to the grand jury's power to decide whether the evidence is suf-
ficient to issue an indictment, is inherently more prosecutorial than in-
vestigative in nature. The second is weakened by the fact that even at
a grand jury investigation, defense counsel can be informed about the
content of the proceedings by the witness immediately after the
questioning." With this potential for disclosure to counsel already present,
the right to have counsel at the questioning would add little to the risk
that important information will be prematurely revealed.
The third justification for exclusion of counsel -the danger of excessive
delays -does not seem as compelling in the case of prosecutorial inter-
rogations as in the case of grand juries because of the differences be-
tween the two proceedings. Delays might seriously hamper grand jury
investigations because of the backlog of matters to be dealt with or the
infrequency of meetingsY Such problems would be relatively unimpor-
tant in the case of prosecutorial interrogations because the smaller number
of participants allows more flexible scheduling and saves time in ques-
tioning. Moreover, prosecutorial interrogations, because they are discre-
tionary, need not be used as frequently as grand jury proceedings.
Similarly, the fourth justification -the witness' opportunity to exonerate
himself at trial -may be true for grand jury investigations, but cannot
be claimed as strongly for prosecutorial interrogations. A victim of
prosecutorial abuse would have to prove the impropriety of the circum-
stances surrounding a statement obtained at a prosecutorial interrogation
to prevent it from being introduced as evidence. Proving this would be
difficult if counsel was not present since the witnesses would all be
members of the prosecutor's staff. The same proof problems would develop
if the witness' incriminating statement was not used at trial, but merely
2 C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 388 (1980).
Id. See generally United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958).
24 C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 22, at 388.
2 Id.
See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 7, at 716.
Grand juries often convene year round in larger cities where they are unable to han-
dle the heavy flow of cases. In smaller towns and rural areas, grand juries are often called
only once or twice a year. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 7, at 11.
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used to obtain other inculpatory evidence.' Moreover, even if the victim
of the abuse were able to have the evidence suppressed, it might still
be available to the prosecution for impeachment purposes.'
Although commentators suggest that the grand jury is no longer the
guardian of liberty it once was, the value of the grand jury in preventing,
at the least, egregious violations of an individual's rights is hard to deny."
This is partially a result of the role of grand jurors as witnesses. Without
the presence of neutral grand jurors, an individual abusively treated dur-
ing questioning by a prosecutor would have little chance of having the
violations rectified because the only witnesses to the abuse would be
members of the prosecutor's staff." In contrast, should there by any ques-
tion regarding events occurring before a grand jury, grand jurors can
testify to what they witnessed.' Counsel present at a prosecutorial in-
terrogation could act in the same capacity as a grand juror by being a
witness to the questioning who would have no ties to the prosecution.
Otherwise, the situation would be identical to a grand jury without grand
jurors. Hence, counsel at a prosecutorial interrogation would have the
power and responsibility to stop any abuse of a witness, but should he
fail, he would at least be available to testify on his client's behalf.
Perhaps the most telling difference between the two forms of proceed-
ings, however, is that the prosecutor has a greater incentive to abuse
a witness than a grand jury due to his function in the criminal justice
system. The main duties of a grand jury are to perform investigations
and to consider indictments.' The prosecutor, however, develops the case
from beginning to end. He not only assists the investigation and sees the
case through indictment or information, but also represents the people
of the state at trial. A grand jury, on the other hand, has evidence brought
before it, then weighs that evidence and decides solely whether to indict
a suspect. If a grand jury investigation uncovers evidence tending to
incriminate an individual, but that evidence is not sufficient for a
conviction,' the grand jury can still fulfill its duty by indicting the
See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
See M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY 99-100 (1975); Antell, TheModern Grand
Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. J. 153, 155 (1965).
", The presence of grand jurors prevents physical coercion as well as other blatant viola-
tions such as threats of additional prosecution. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 7, at 720.
1 Even if the individual who was abused was able to produce witnesses to that abuse,
a co-defendant could be convicted by evidence resulting from the abuse because he would
not have standing to object. See Duckett v. State, 600 S.W.2d 18, 20-21 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
This result further emphasizes the need for counsel at all prosecutorial interrogations.
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 347 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
See Y. KAMISAR, V. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 7, at 712-13.
There are a number of reasons why a case would be submitted to the grand jury
before proof beyond a reasonable doubt is compiled. The prosecutor may think that the
suspect is dangerous or may flee the jurisdiction and will have him indicted to legitimize
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individual.' Whether the investigation is by the prosecutor or the grand
jury, however, if the state loses at trial, the prosecutor may suffer a per-
sonal embarrassment. Since the prosecutor is normally elected to office,'
any public embarrassment will hinder his chances for reelection as well
as damage his reputation. The prosecutor therefore has an inherent in-
centive to obtain additional incriminating information by coercion or
trickery. Of course, most prosecutors honor their ethical duty' and do
not coerce witnesses. Nevertheless, enforcement of constitutional
guarantees is necessary to protect victims from those few prosecutors
who would resort to coercion.
The prosecutorial interrogation's lack of the inherent safeguards pre-
sent within the grand jury system destroys the persuasiveness of any
analogy between the two types of investigations. The differences in the
two types of interrogations also suggest that the protections of counsel
afforded a person questioned by a grand jury are insufficient to fully pro-
tect a person compelled to answer a prosecutor's questions. The right
to counsel is necessary not only to prevent possible abuse, but also to
promote the witness' awareness and invocation of rights guaranteed to
him by the Constitution.
Protection for Witnesses Questioned at an
Administrative Investigation
Administrative investigations may also be compared to prosecutorial
interrogations. 9 Administrative investigations share some of the
resemblances to prosecutorial interrogations that grand jury investiga-
tions have."' In In re Groban,41 the United States Supreme Court held
that an individual does not necessarily have a right to counsel when
questioned by an administrative agency." This conclusion, however, was
incarceration with the hope that a continuing investigation will uncover additional evidence.
The prosecutor may also submit such a case to fulfill his statutory duty to prosecute. See,
e.g., IND. CODE § 33-14-1-3 (1976).
In states that allow the institution of criminal charges through an information, a pros-
ecutor will occasionally submit a seemingly weak case to the grand jury merely to shift
the responsibility for determining the merit of a controversial or unpopular case. Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 7, at 1019. Should the grand jury return an
indictment in such a case, the prosecutor is forced to prosecute a case that he has little
chance of winning.
' In many states, the grand jury is directed to indict if it finds probable cause to believe
that the accused has committed a crime. See e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1124(d) (Smith-
Hurd 1980).
E.g. IND. CODE 5 33-14-1-1 (1976).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13, EC 7-14 (1979).
3 See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 349-50 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
, See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
352 U.S. 330 (1957).
'z Id. In Groban, a five Justice majority (the plurality and the concurring opinions) agreed
that an administrative investigation conducted by a fire marshal was analogous to a grand
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based on the fact that administrative investigations are frequently not
adjudicatory in nature, but instead delve into issues of fact and only in-
cidentally uncover such facts as whether a crime has been committed."
A majority of Justices noted that investigations directly leading to criminal
prosecutions, such as an investigation by a district attorney, would compel
a different result."
The rationale of the separate opinion in Groban was subsequently ex-
tended by Mathis v. United States," in which the Supreme Court held that
an Internal Revenue Service agent is required to give Miranda warnings
and recitation of rights to a suspect before conducting a custodial
interrogation."' Included among the Miranda rights is the right to counsel
to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.4 ' Mathis seems applicable
to virtually any administrative investigation." The right to counsel,
however, has rarely been addressed in recent years because most federal
administrative agencies have already promulgated guidelines providing
the right to counsel to individuals under interrogation.49
Although as a general rule individuals interrogated by an administrative
agency do not have a right to counsel, the majority of the Justices in
Groban drew a distinction between cases that lead to criminal prosecu-
tions and those that are civil in nature.' This distinction has been ac-
cepted by many administrative agencies that havse issued guidelines afford-
ing the right to counsel to suspects subjected to interrogation. This distinc-
tion between criminal and civil investigations in the field of administra-
tive law leads to the conclusion that.investigations which naturally lead
to criminal prosecution should require the right to counsel at the time
of interrogation.
Protections for Witnesses Interrogated by Police
Prosecutorial interrogations more closely resemble police interrogations
jury investigation and therefore a witness before an administrative investigation did not
have a right to counsel. Id. at 332-33 (plurality opinion); see id. at 336 (concurring opinion).
Justice Black, joined by three Justices, disagreed about the persuasiveness of the analogy
between administrative and grand jury investigations. Id. at 346-49 (Black, J., dissenting).
The dissent argued that the lack of grand jurors in an administrative investigation
distinguished it from questioning before a grand jury. Justice Black compared the
administrative hearing to an investigation conducted by a prosecutor and concluded that
there should be a right to counsel at administrative investigations.
'3 Id. at 332 (plurality opinion).
" Id. at 337 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 349-50 (Black, J., dissenting).
'5 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
46 Id. at 4.
" See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
" 391 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); Note, Extending Miranda to Administrative
Investigations, 56 VA. L. REV. 690, 690 n.3 (1970).
49 See, e.g., United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970).
1 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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than do the kinds of interrogations considered thus far. Both prosecutors
and police interrogate suspects or other witnesses to discover relevant
information. Both have the same goal: to obtain information that will lead
to a criminal conviction. The potential for abuse by both is also similar."
The legal maxim that similar cases should be treated in a similar manner
is particularly appropriate in these circumstances.
Substantial inequities could result if prosecutors could interrogate
suspects without the presence of counsel when under the same
circumstances the police could not. Interrogations would be channeled
through the prosecutor, who could get away with the same coercive tactics
that the police would be prohibited from using. This would be an artificial
distinction with little rational basis. This artificiality would be particular-
ly apparent in cases involving the interrogation of a suspect by both pro-
secutors and police. Any analysis based on a determination of whether
the incident was a police or prosecutorial interrogation would be nonsen-
sical. The important issue should be whether any abuse took place, not
the identity of the individuals who performed it. To avoid inconsistency
and artificiality there must be an equal application of relevant constitu-
tional provisions.
Sixth Amendment Protections
In response to abusive police interrogations," safeguards have been
developed to protect individuals interrogated by the police.' Of these
safeguards, one of the most important is that provided by the sixth amend-
ment which entitles an individual to have an attorney's assistance once
adversary proceedings are commenced against him.' The commencement
of adversary proceedings occurs, however, when an individual is indicted
or otherwise formally charged." This limitation of the application of the
sixth amendment to post-indictment situations prevents individuals from
asserting the sixth amendment right to counsel at routine pre-indictment
police interrogations.' Analogously, it appears that the sixth amendment
as currently applied could not apply to prosecutorial interrogations that
occur before indictment or the institution of formal charges. 7
5' See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra. Abuses arising from police interrogations
have been well documented. Perhaps the best known discussion is in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 445-56 (1966).
' See. e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-56 (1966).
=' E.g., id. at 444 (Miranda warnings and recitation of rights).
' See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977). The sixth amendment right to counsel
was extended to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
' Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-70 (1981); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226-29
(1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. at 469-70.
Although this note advocates the application of the fifth and fourteenth amendments




Although the sixth amendment does not extend the right to counsel
to a person being interrogated by a prosecutor before the commencement
of adversary proceedings,' the rights 9 and warnings"0 enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona ' arguably should apply. Among
these rights is the right of an individual to have counsel present when
he is subjected to a custodial interrogation.62 The presence of counsel
safeguards the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination by providing protection from a coercive environment.63
The rights and warnings of Miranda have been most frequently ap-
plied to police interrogations." The application of Miranda rights to in-
dividuals interrogated by prosecutors, however, would not be un-
precedented. In Vignera v. New York,65 a companion case to Miranda, two
inculpatory statements were obtained from a suspect. One was elicited
by an assistant district attorney without advising the suspect of his right
to counsel. 6 The Court held that the statement was inadmissible because
the defendant was apprised of neither his fifth amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination nor his right to have counsel pre-
sent at the questioning. 7 No separate discussion was presented to justify
the exclusion of inculpatory statements obtained by a district attorney
as compared to those elicited by the police. In light of Miranda's reliance
on a history of police abuse, however, further justification beyond Vignera
may be necessary to allow the application of the Miranda rule to pros-
ecutorial interrogations generally.
The Miranda court described all the cases involved in its decision as
provide the ideal basis for such a right. In light, however, of recent cases restricting the
sixth amendment right to counsel provision to the beginning of adversary proceedings,
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), to suggest
a drastic change in constitutional thinking at this time is unrealistic. Adoption of the fifth
and fourteenth amendment arguments in this note could act as a springboard for the future
use of the sixth amendment in this context.
See notes 55-56 & accompanying text supra.
5 According to the Supreme Court, Miranda rights are intended to assure that an
individual is accorded his fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966). The Court, however, has since stated that
Miranda warnings are "not themselves protected by the Constitution," but are "prophylactic
standards" designed to safeguard the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-46 (1974).
" "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that
he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
6! 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474.
E.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).





sharing the same salient features: "incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.""
This description fits Vignera because the interrogation by the assistant
district attorney took place at a police station.69 There is no reason to
assume, however, that, from the perspective of a subpoenaed witness,
a prosecutor's office does not provide an atmosphere as coercive as that
at a police station. Without a relevant distinction between the surround-
ings at police stations and prosecutors' offices, the Miranda right to
counsel should be extended to individuals interrogated by a prosecutor.
Furthermore, interrogation techniques used by police are equally
available to prosecutors. Although prosecutors would seem to be less likely
to engage in physical means of coercion, they may well be more adept
at psychological interrogation techniques due to their more extensive legal
and educational backgrounds. 0 This is especially true when the time se-
quence of a criminal investigation is considered. After a crime has been
committed, the police will conduct an investigation, often including a
custodial interrogation of the suspect. Should the investigation uncover
sufficient evidence, the suspect is indicted or otherwise formally charged,
which initiates the individual's protection by the sixth amendment right
to counsel. If the investigation does not uncover sufficient evidence, the
suspect, if in custody, is released, but the investigation continues. After
the investigation is more fully developed, it is turned over to the pro-
secutor, who continues the investigation. The prosecutor uses the infor-
mation already uncovered by the police investigation to recreate the crime.
Through circumstantial evidence and testimony from other sources, the
prosecutor often knows the participants and circumstances of the crime,
but does not possess sufficient admissible evidence to prosecute the case.
The prosecutor now has all of the necessary ingredients to exert great
pressure on the suspect. First, he has the factual basis of the crime
developed by the police investigation that may not have been present
at the time of the initial police interrogation. Second, the prosecutor has
the skills necessary to coerce a suspect psychologically. Third, the at-
mosphere surrounding the interrogation is inherently coercive because
all the participants are aligned with the prosecutor against a potential
defendant who stands alone and must fend for himself. Fourth, the pro-
secutor possesses the power to manipulate charges to intimidate the
suspect. Such manipulation could take the form of an offer of a plea bargain
in return for a confession, or threats of resurrecting dismissed cases, pro-
secuting pending charges with additional vengeance, or vindictive pro-
" Id. at 445.
"' Id. at 493.
0 Along with psychological techniques, prosecuting attorneys are familiar with trial
questioning techniques, such as the use of leading questions, that can trick suspects.
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secution in the future.7 ' Fifth, a prosecutor through the subpeona power
can force a suspect to appear and answer questions under pain of
contempt.72
These factors not only develop and support an analogy between pros-
ecutorial and police interrogations that requires extending the Miranda
right to counsel to prosecutorial interrogations, but together suggest a
potential for abuse surpassing that possible in police interrogations, chiefly
as a result of the greater leverage available to the prosecutor. A pros-
ecuting attorney conducting an interrogation begins with an advantage
by possessing information from a more thorough investigation than that
available to the police at the time of their interrogation. In both types
of interrogations the suspect is held incommunicado at the office of the
interrogator. From the standpoint of the suspect, one atmosphere is just
as coercive as the other. At this point, the comparision between the
investigations stops because the prosecutor has powers unavailable to
the police, most notably the ability to manipulate charges. A policeman
can say that a confession may be considered favorably by the prosecutor
or judge,7" but cannot bind the state to a plea bargain. Any threat by
the police regarding possible charges is likely to be viewed as police
harassment rather than the credible threat of more intensive prosecu-
tion that a prosecutor may wield. Beyond the ability to manipulate charges,
the prosecutor with the subpeona power might also compel a suspect to
answer questions that the suspect could lawfully refuse to answer before
the police. Should the suspect refuse to answer a prosecutor by invoking
the privilege against self-incrimination, he would leave himself open to
imprisonment for a contempt charge supported by testimony of the pros-
ecutor and his staff.74 It is difficult to imagine anything more "compulsory"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment than testimony at a pros-
ecutorial inquisition induced by fear of imprisonment through use of the
contempt power.
Without the aid of counsel, a suspect cannot be expected to withstand
the pressure created by the contempt power, the manipulation of charges,
a coercive atmosphere, and psychological interrogation techniques without
involuntarily waiving constitutional rights. Even a suspect informed of
his fifth amendment rights before interrogation would be unlikely to have
any idea of when or how to raise any of his constitutional privileges.7 5
Any recitation of warnings absent the Miranda right to counsel would
therefore likely be a hollow protection for the individual interrogated by
11 It is not known how often this type of behavior occurs, but the potential severity
of the violations requires the presence of counsel as a prophylactic measure.
See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
' See notes 28 & 32 & accompanying text supra.
71 In re Groban, 352 U.S. at 345-46 (Black, J., dissenting).
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
a prosecutor. As the Supreme Court stated: "The presence of counsel
• . . would be the adequate protective device necessary to make . . .
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against compulsory
self-incrimination]. His presence would insure that statements made in
the government-established atmosphere are not the product of
compulsion." 6
Application of Miranda to Prosecutorial Interrogations
For Miranda to apply to prosecutorial interrogations, two prerequisites
must be met: first, there must be an interrogation,77 and second, the in-
dividual must be in custody at the time of the interrogation." An interroga-
tion is a deliberate attempt to elicit information. 9 A prosecutorial
interrogation clearly meets this standard. In defining custody, the Supreme
Court has stressed two factors: the individual's lack of freedom to depart'
and the involuntariness of the individual's appearance at the location of
the interrogation."1 Both these factors are present in a prosecutorial
interrogation. An individual who leaves the prosecutor's office during an
interrogation can be held in contempt. The threat of contempt forces the
witness to stay at the location of the interrogation. Any attempt to flee
will merely result in the return of the individual to custody by his arrest.
Likewise, any voluntariness in appearing at the location of the interroga-
tion is illusory. An individual subpoenaed by a prosecutor could refuse
to appear, but he would be arrested for contempt. The choice presented
is to appear at the interrogation or to be arrested and taken to the
interrogation, at which time Miranda would clearly apply. In either event,
the individual will appear at the interrogation. The reality of the situa-
tion compels the, conclusion that since the individual is not free to depart
and did not appear voluntarily, he must be considered to be in custody
within the meaning of Miranda.
Application of the Miranda right to counsel to prosecutorial interroga-
tions is necessary to prevent abuse that otherwise would not be exposed.
Miranda was based on a history and expectancy of police abuses.' Pros-
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 466. An alternative to the requirement of the presence
of counsel at a prosecutorial interrogation would be to require the presence of a court
reporter to record a verbatim account of the questioning. This, however, would not protect
against abuses absent from the transcript or give the protection that only an adversary
is capable of giving. See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
" Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-302 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
399-401 (1977).
78 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969).
71 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
8o Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495; Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. at 327.
8, Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495. The individual need not be taken to the interroga-
tion against his will to be in custody, but if he arrives at the scene of the interrogation
voluntarily, an inference is created that the individual is not in custody. Id.
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 445-56.
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ecutors, like other state officials, are often presumed to act in a fair and
orderly manner until challenged by facts to the contrary.' This pre-
sumptive difference between prosecutors and police may be justified in
theory, but it can only be expected that violations of constitutional rights
by prosecutors would rarely be exposed. Due to the prosecutor's ability
to threaten a witness with additional prosecution on unrelated charges
and to prohibit the presence of parties who could testify for the witness
regarding the coercion employed, the prosecutor may force a witness into
acquiescing to intimidation.
The ability to hold a threat over the head of a witness to prevent the
exposure of prosecutorial abuse along with the potential severity of these
abuses buttresses the argument for counsel at prosecutorial interroga-
tions. The solution for this problem is the Miranda right to counsel. The
application of Miranda, as compelled by a showing of custodial interroga-
tion, would fully protect the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination of an individual questioned by a prosecutor.
DUE PROCESS FOR A WITNESS QUESTIONED
AT A PROSECUTORIAL INTERROGATION
Miranda and the fifth amendment do not stand alone in providing a
basis for extending the right to counsel to a person being interrogated
by a prosecutor before indictment. The concept of "fundamental fairness"'
embodied in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause dictates the
same result.
The term "due process of law" is a flexible concept of justice which
defies an exact definition appropriate for all occasions. In the criminal
context the Supreme Court has defined its standard of review under the
due process clause as focusing upon the inquiry of "whether the [state]
action complained of... violates those 'fundamental conceptions of justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,' ... and which
define 'the community's sense of fair play and decency.' "86 The goal of
'3See In re Groban, 352 U.S. at 334; Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Miller, 583 P.2d 1042,
1048 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
" See generally Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
"5 Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow re-
quirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which the
courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society. But basic rights
do not become petrified as of any one time, even though, as a matter of human
experience, some. may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of
the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed
reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process
is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time
be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294
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the criminal justice system in the United States is not merely to convict
the guilty, but to insure that trials are conducted fairlyY The system
suffers when it treats any member of society unfairly." To compel the
disclosure of information from a suspect through a closed interrogation
introduces an element of unfairness which cannot be eliminated through
after-the-fact judicial safeguards.' Prevention of a fair trial by abuse of
a witness in derogation of his constitutional rights at a prosecutorial
interrogation can only be considered a violation of these "fundamental
conceptions of justice."90
Furthermore, failure to provide the right to counsel to a witness ques-
tioned by a prosecutor would allow the prosecutor to determine when
the suspect's right to counsel begins. By delaying the indictment or in-
formation, the prosecutor could prolong the period in which he may law-
fully interrogate the suspect without counsel under the sixth amendment.
The speedy trial provision of the sixth amendment applies only to the
lapse of time after indictment.91 However, in United States v. Lovasco,92
the Supreme Court acknowledged that the due process clause prohibits
a prejudicial delay in bringing an indictment because the practice deviates
from standards of "fair play and decency."93 The Court recognized that
prejudice to the defendant caused by the prosecutor's delay to gain a
tactical advantage violates the due process clause.9' Any interrogation
by a prosecutor violative of a witness' rights before indictment or infor-
mation will similarly give the prosecutor a tactical advantage that will
prejudice the witness because vital information that is given, even if
suppressed, will cause irreparable damage.95 However, the routine rever-
sal of any conviction following the obtaining of information through a pre-
indictment prosecutorial interrogation seems unnecessarily harsh. A less
U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (prosecutor's deliberate nondisclosure of perjured testimony violates
due process); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (forcible pumping of suspect's
stomach violates due process).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Brady the suppression of evidence favorable
to an accused who had requested it was held to violate due process by preventing a fair
trial. Brady, however, is merely one in a long line of cases using the due process clause
to insure fair trials. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213 (1942).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87.
See text accompanying notes 28 & 32 supra.
Many Supreme Court decisions have acknowledged that the protection of rights at
trial is an objective of the pretrial privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 466 (citing In re Groban, 352 U.S. at 340-52 (Black, J.,
dissenting)); Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHi.
L. REV. 313, 320 (1964); Note, An Historical Argunwnt for the Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1048-51 (1964).
, United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1971).
9 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
Id. at 789-90.
Id. at 795 n.17.
9 See text accompanying notes 28-29 & 89 supra.
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drastic solution would permit pre-indictment prosecutorial interrogations
if the suspect enjoyed the right to counsel. Such an approach would pro-
tect the interests of the suspect as well as promote the interests of
efficient law enforcement by allowing prosecutors to use a valuable tool
in the investigation of crime. In terms of "fundamental fairness," the right
to counsel would protect the rights of the suspect while placing the least
possible burden on the state.9
Extension of a per se rule requiring the right to counsel through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is not an unprecedented
development. The right to counsel was extended on due process grounds
to juvenile proceedings that could result in confinement in In re Gault.97
The holding in Gault was based on the realization that counsel is often
indispensable to a fair hearing.98 The rationale for extension of the right
to counsel to juvenile proceedings can also be applied to individuals com-
pelled to answer a prosecutor's questions. Without counsel, an individual
has virtually no protection from unfair proceedings: other than the suspect,
no witnesses will be available to testify to any abuse except witnesses
favorable to the prosecution. Information discovered through unfair
proceedings would necessarily taint the trial even if it were not intro-
duced as evidence. 9 -The irremediable prejudice that would result calls
for a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of constitutional rights.
A per se application of the right to counsel would prevent prosecutorial
abuse and insure the fairness required by the due process clause.' 0 The
prophylactic effect of a per se application of the right to counsel would
remedy the inherent difficulty in having abusive practices exposed'0 1 as
" The fundamental unfairness of a prosecutor's attempt to restrict a defendant's right
to appeal is analogous to the lack of fundamental fairness when a suspect does not have
the right to counsel when interrogated by a prosecutor. In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21 (1974), the Supreme Court used the due process clause to prohibit a prosecutor from
raising a criminal charge against an individual from a misdemeanor to a felony in retal-
iation for appealing conviction on the misdemeanor. Id. at 22-23, 28-29. Blackledge is ap-
plicable to prosecutorial intdirrogations because in both cases the prosecutor may attempt
to prevent an individual from fully utilizing the means available to protect himself from
criminal charges. In Blackledge the prosecutor attempted to chill the use of the appellate
process, while in a prosecutorial interrogation the prosecutor might prevent the use of
counsel. In fact, the argument for due process protection of the right to counsel for pro-
secutorial questioning is even stronger than for the appellate process because the pro-
secutor can eliminate the use of counsel in the critical period of interrogation. In Blackledge
the individual was able to appeal the case, and was penalized only afterwards. Id.
" 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
Id. at 40 (quoting N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 1962) (amended 1970)).
See text accompanying notes 28-29 & 89 supra.
The Supreme Court has used the due process clause to justify prophylactic measures
against unfairness on many other occasions. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969) (due process prohibits judge from imposing greater sentence in retaliation for
successful appeal); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (due process requires that jurors
be impartial and disinterested to insure fair trial).
"I See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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well as decrease the need for adjudication of complaints of prosecutorial
abuse.'02
The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that a per se application of the right to
counsel be extended to individuals who are questioned at prosecutorial
interrogations. Such an extension of the right to counsel is consistent with
the Supreme Court's historical use of such a right as a means to insure
fair proceedings. A per se application of the right to counsel would act
not only as a remedy to the problem of prosecutorial abuse, but also as
a deterrent to future abuse.
CONCLUSION
The fifth amendment, as interpreted and implemented by Miranda, and
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment should be interpreted
to provide a right to counsel to a witness at a prosecutorial interroga-
tion. Grand jury right-to-counsel cases are not applicable to prosecutorial
investigations. Distinctions between the general rule for the right to
counsel in administrative investigations and cases leading to criminal pros-
ecution support the argument for a right to counsel for individuals subjec-
ted to prosecutorial interrogations. The similarities between prosecutorial
and police interrogations require the application of the Miranda right
to counsel to protect individuals questioned by prosecutors from possible
abuse. The fundamental fairness standard of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment also provides a basis for a per se application
of the right to counsel at prosecutorial interrogations.
DANIEL E. SERBAN
'' Case-by-case adjudication of prosecutorial abuse would encourage an increased number
of complaints because that would be the only way to redress abuse. The ability of the
prosecutor to intimidate witnesses, however, may diminish the effect of this encourage-
ment. A per se application of the right to counsel would diminish rather than increase
the need for litigation of prosecutorial abuse cases.
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